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views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or any other part of the Federal
Reserve. System.Weakness in the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar in
recent experience focused greater attention on the dollar I s future as a
reserve currency.1 Reports of permanent diversification into other
reserve currencies, even by officia1 entities, increased markedly during
1978 and 1979. Most frequently menti oned alternative currencies were the
Deutschemark and the Swi ss franc, and some reference to the Japanese yen
and other currencies al so has been made.2 There has even been some
reported sentiment, primarily from European quarters, for reviving the
official monetary role of gol d--not necessarily by reinstituting any form
1. Although economists long have recognized the potential for
greater reserve diversification under a system of flexib1e exchange rates,
some uncertainty seemed to exist as to whether it wou1 d actually occur in
practiceo Some analyses about the time of the advent of managed floating
rates were more optimistic, if guardedly so at points, about the dollar's
continued role at the center of the world financial system. See for
example Cooper [1972 and 1973] and Whitman [1974]. Not surprisingly more
concern about such diversification seems to arise when the dollar is under
downward pressure in the market. This was true to an extent in 1973 as the
dollar's value continued to fall after the second discrete devaluation of
the decade. See Salant [1973]. More recent analyses, in addition to
generally somewhat more alarmist versions in the popular press (see, for
example, Business Week [1979] and U.S. News and World Report [1979]1,
include Euromoney [1978], Laney [1978], Triffin [1979], and Rose [1979].
2. On the yen see Gregory [1979]. A weaker yen more recently
has suppressed some reference to this currency, and it is unclear in any
case whether it might achieve a truly international role or be the center
of some sort of "Asian currency area."
. Among other currencies, it has even been suggested that with the
removal of exchange controls the role of the British pound might be
revived. See Brown [1979].
For an analysis of the rising role, of the primary alternative
currency to the dollar, the German mark, see Month1{ Report of the Deutsche
Bundesbank [1979]. The Bundesbank estimates tha ln ml d-19/9 the marl<
accounted for 11.3 percent of total officia1 foreign exchange reserves
excluding West Germany's own, compared to 7.7 percent in 1975.2
of the gold standard, but simply by recognizing its potential as a free-
asset alternative to currencies in additions to central bank portfolios.3
Official reserve asset diversification has reportedly occurred in
both national currency markets and the euromarkets, and has been recognized
formally as a likely future trend by national and international
agencies.4 For its part, the United States, while drawing attention to
such factors as greater depth of U.S. capital markets and other aspects
that tend other things equal to underpin a continued major role for the
dollar, has stated that it will not attempt to artificially perpetuate the
international status of its currency. And inherent in November 1978 U.S.
dollar support initiatives was at least some willingness to institute
greater symmetry among currencies: by issuing bonds denominated in foreign
currencies to finance balance-of-payments deficits, the United States
demonstrated a mi nor incl inati on to borrow and amass its own forei gn
currency reserves, rather than rely strictly on short-term central bank
swap lines and continued traditional financing of the deficit by increasing
dollar-denominated liabilities to foreigners. Spokesmen for potential new
reserve currency countries have acquiesced to the point that they recognize
at least some enlarged role for them is quite likely, even though generally
they remain extremely reluctant to assume significant reserve center
3. See, for example, The Wall Street Journal [1980].
4. See, for example, 8ank for International Settlements [1979]
and Economic Report of the President [1980].3
responsibilities because of the effects that it would have and the
constraints that it would put on their relatively more open economies.5
Agai nst this backdrop, more serious and urgent di scussion has
been revived for instituting a larger role for the International Monetary
Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the primary store of international
liquidity.6 In the 1960's, the original impetus toward making the SDR the
worl d monetary system's principal reserve asset came from concern about
adequate i nternational 1iquidi ty ina gol d exchange standard worl d. The
floating of exchange rates generally in the early 1970' s made this concern
rather obsolete, and resulted in the redefinition of the SDR in 1974 as a
basket of sixteen currencies rather than continui ng its fixed 1ink vi a the
U.S. dollar to gold'? This method of defining the SDR's value means that
5. In general, Switzerland and Japan have been less adamant in
their opposition than West Germany, but this may be largely because of the
mark's apparent position as the front-runni ng alternative currency to the
dollar. For one statement of the Swiss attitude see Leutwiler [1980J.
Hayami [1979] and Bundesbank [1979, op. cit.J provide some insight into
Japanese and German attitudes, respectively.
6. For discussions of the evolution of the SDR and measures
taken to enhance its role, see the IMF Survey, various issues. r~ore
negative recent assessments of the SDR's role are found in Chrystal [1978J,
Haberler [1979], Murphy [1979], and Sacchetti [1979].
7. Originally one SDR was defined as equal to one U.S. dollar
when the U.S. unit was still linked to gold at $35 per ounce. The SDR/gold
link was maintained after the dollar price of gold changed in 1971, but the
variation in the value of the SDR vis-a-vis individual currencies in a
floating rate world ultimately forced its redefinition as a weighted basket
of national currency units. Weights in the basket were originally deter-
mined by countries' shares in world exports in the 1968-1972 period, but
the U.S. dollar's share was modified somewhat to account for nontrade as-
pects of the currency's importance. One redefinition occurred in July 1978
when the Saudi Arabian riyal and the Iranian rial replaced the Danish krone
and the South African rand in the basket. The basket, under existing IMF
plans, is subject to further revision at five-year intervals. The next
such review of weights in the basket is scheduled for 1983. At that time
it is currently intended that modification of weights to reflect a curren-
cy's financial importance will be extended to nondollar currencies as well,
based on the amount of a country's currency held in other members' re-
serves. See Polak (1979) for discussion.4
it is likely to be more stable in terms of a chosen national currency unit
than some other single national currency is vis-a-vis that unit, since
exchange rate risk is diversified among the various currencies in the
basket.8 If official monetary agencies were to hold a major portion of
their international reserves in SDR's, it is argued, valuation risk on
these reserves would tend to be less than if a single currency such as the
dollar were held instead.
Even though exchange rate risk mi ght be reduced by SDR
consolidation of the "dollar overhang," however, it would still not be
minimized in a portfolio context. This paper will demonstrate that, if
participation in the IMF's proposed substitution account is not compulsory,
some incentives for reserve asset diversification may still exist.
Moreover, the SDR proportions in optimally diversified portfolios might be
smaller than many currently envision. It is not argued here that an
evolving multiple currency reserve asset system is desirable necessarily,
even though its drawbacks ultimately may be 1ess than some have contended.
But it is argued that even if other obstacles to institution of the
substitution account are overcome, it still may not accomplish, as long as
the SDR is defined as it is presently, the intended goal of eliminating
potentially destab1izing portfolio shifts among various reserve assets.
Substitution Account Proposals
It is currently proposed that the SDR substitution account would




As pointed out by Chrystal Cop. cit.,
need not necessarily be more stable
not inc1 uded, in the basket.
p. 21], however, the
than all currencies5
participating central banks, issuing in their place $OR-denominated claims
on the account. The account is intended to affect only the composition of
total international reserves, not their level. The incentive for central
bank participation in the account, which would be voluntary, is presumed to
derive largely from the above mentioned lower volatility of the SOR, so
that overall the risk on international reserves inherent in a managed
floating exchange rate world would be less.
Table 1 includes the units of each individual currency in the
SOR's present composition, along with percentage weights prevailing on one
given recent date. Although the SOR floats separately from all national
currencies because of this definition, it woul d not be strictly correct to
say that it floats independently from them. The more important weight for
the U.S. dollar in the definition, for example, means that there will be
some tendency for the SOR to fluctuate with the dollar vis-a-vis any third
unit, even though in terms of that third unit the fluctuations of the SOR
will tend to be less volatile because of other currencies in the basket.
While risk may be reduced, however, there is a negative aspect
with respect to the $OR's yield: currently it is less than that attainable
on investments in currencies. Table 1 also indicated weights and interest
rates from which this yield is determined. Only some fraction of the
computed weighted market rate is paid on existing SOR balances.9 Figure 1
compares the weighted market rate with that actually paid on existing SOR
9. This fraction was 60 percent from mid-1974 through 1978. At
the beginning of 1979 it was changed to 72 percent on creditor SOR
positions and 80 percent on debtor positions.Table 1
Special Drawing Right Capital Valuation Weights








u.S. dollar .400 30.4 49
German mark .320 14.0 18
British pound .050 8.6 . 11
French franc .420 7.9 11
Japanese yen 21.000 6.7 11
Canadian dollar .070 4.6
Dutch guilder .140 5.5
Italian lira 52.000 4.9
Belgian franc 1.600 4.3
Saudi Arabian riyal .130 2.9
Iranian rial 1. 700 1.8
Swedish krona .110 2.0
Australian dollar .017 1.4
Austrian schilling .280 1.7
Norwegian krone .100 1.6
Spanish peseta 1.500 1.7
100.0 100
1/ Interest rate weights are applied to the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S.
and the U.K., 3-month interbank deposit rates in West Germany and France, and
the unconditional call money rate in Japan.Percent
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holdings. Substitution account claims may not be exactly equivalent to the
presently existing SDR assets, and the interest yield paid on them would
not necessarily be the same. But one overall goal is to enhance the role
of SDR in the monetary system, and this would not be achieved by having the
existing balances and substitution account claims considered as two
separate assets, so that similarity of yield and basic definitional
characteristics is likely.
If the substitution account proposal is to be successful, several
hurdles must be overcome. The basic issues are those concerning the
liquidity of the SDR, the solvency of the substitution account itself, and
the fundamental desi rabi1ity of the SDR as a reserve asset ina portfolio
context.lO
If the SDR is to compete with national currencies, especially one
such as the U.S. dollar in which money markets are highly developed, then
its liquidity obviously is important. But since the SDR is not held and
traded in private markets, it cannot be used as an intervention medium by
central banks. Some currency bal ances for intervention woul d be requi red
then in addition to the SDR and this automatically precludes the existence
of a single asset reserve system. With at least one and perhaps several
reserve currencies held also, the tendency toward a multiple currency
system might not be completely eliminated. Ultimately, extensive private
use of the SDR might be possible, but the record to date does not cause one
to be optimistic on this. And private markets are quite capable of
10. For discussion of these issues see Sobol [1979] and Morgan
Guaranty Bank [1979a].7
inventing their own currency baskets when the demand for them arises,
tailored to specific needs.11
The solvency issue arises from the substitution account's balance
sheet. If the account is sponsored by the IMF but is not backed by any of
the Fund's own resources, then dollar assets must be balanced against
SOR-denominated liabilities. If the interest yiel d on U. S. Treasury
obligations in which the account's assets are held is less than the yield
the account commits itself to pay on its liabilities, or if the dollar's
own exchange value depreciates relative to the SOR, then solvency of the
account could be questioned. It may be politically unrealistic to expect
the United States to consent to guaranteeing the account's solvency. This
could entail the controversial payment of higher interest rates by the
U.S. government to the account than to other holders of government debt, or
alternatively it might simply dictate higher U.S. interest rates overall.
But the latter has elements of allowing the international constraint to
dictate U.S. monetary policy, and while this constraint has in fact been an
important one in recent experience, part of the U. S. support for the
account may derive from the hope that the constraint can be relaxed.
Oi rect U.S. exchange rate guarantees on the account's dollar assets are
also controversial, since ultimately they entail having the U.S. taxpayer
assume the exchange rate risk of foreign central banks. Basically, if the
U.S were going to take such steps to ensure the yield and exchange value of
11. Several such private sector currency baskets that have been
used since the advent of managed floating are discussed in see Aschheim and
Park [1976]. But interestingly none of these, however imaginative, has
really caught on either.8
its forei gn dollar 1iabilities, it coul d do so without invoking IMF
substitution account auspicies at all.
One recently proposed attempt to overcome the sol vency problem
involves backing the account's SDR-denominated liabilities with some
portion of the IMF's gold stock. Since this gold is owned ultimately by
IMF members, their approval of this plan is required, however, and there
may be some opposition. Support is more likely from countries that do not
wish to see their currencies used as reserves than from some less-developed
countries that previously have benefited from the sale of IMF gold. If the
gold backing plan is approved, proponents envision that the problem of
exchange rate guarantees will be overcome, and it may enable the payment of
a more competitive yield on substitution account claims.
The issue of SDR desirability relative to other reserve assets is
partially linked to the solvency issue by the determination of the yield to
be paid on the SDR-denominated claims. But in addition to relative yield
aspects of SDR desirability and the previously noted aspect of the
vol atility or risk of the SDR relative to other reserve asset choices, the
typical relationship of all potential reserve assets to each also can be
important.
The following analysis does not address the liquidi~ or solvency
problems directly, even though they both relate to the desirability9
question.12 It is the purpose of this paper to approach the issue of SDR
appeal to central bank investors from the standpoint of rUdimentary
portfolio analysis, assuming voluntary substitution account participation
and that the current definition of the SDR as a basket of currencies
remains intact for substitution account claims.
Reserve Asset Choice in a Portfolio Context
It seems quite appropriate to analyse the problem of official
reserve asset choice ina worl d of general ized floating exchange rates
using a standard portfolio framework.13 ,14 The essential aspect of
asset diversification to minimize total portfolio risk for any given
expected portfolio return involves the correlation among individual
assets. In this context the standard two-asset portfoli 0 probl em is to
minimize portfolio variance,
12. In addition to the relationship of desirability to the
solvency question noted above, liquidity also is obviously related to
desirability via the imputed risk associated with holding various assets.
13. Earl ier 1iterature on the official reserve asset choice
decision under the gold exchange standard focused more on why countries
hel d their reserves in gol d versus forei gn exchange generally. For
analyses of reserve choice under the gol d exchange standard, see Kenen
[1963], Greene [1968], Hagemann [1969], Officer and Willett [1969], and
Makin [1971 and 1972a]. See also Makin [1972b] on coexistence of SDRs and
a reserve currency under fixed parities, and Dreyer [1977] for discussion
of an SDR exchange standard. An empirical investigation of central bank
reserve currency preferences under managed floating is Heller and Kni ght
[1978]. .
This portfolio approach under managed floating also may be seen
to derive some theoretical underpinning from the "asset market" approach to
exchange rate determination that has gained acceptance in recent years.
See, for example, Frenkel [1976] and Bilson [1979] among many others.




\1p = xl \11 + x2 \12'
xl + x2 =I, and
xl,x2~0,
cr2 = total portfolio variance p
\1p = total portfolio return
cr1 = standard deviation of asset 1
cr2 = standard deviation of asset 2
\11 = return on asset 1
\12 = return on asset 2
xl = proportion of portfolio held in asset 1





012 = correlation between assets 1 and 2; (-1 ~ 012 + 1).
Constraint (2) specifies some level of desired portfolio return, (3) in-
sures a fully invested portfolio, and (4) limits optimal x's to assets, or
long positions only.
Gi ven other parameters, i will be reduced as °12 approaches mi- p
nus one. Figure 2 illustrates four possibilities for 012 in \1p• crp space.
If 012 = 1.0, equation (1) reduces to
(5 )Figure 2
Reserve Choice Between Two Assets
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Expression (6) is linear, and assets 1 and 2 behave as one asset; "p = "1
if only asset 1 is held and "p ="2 if only asset 2 is held. There is no
gain from diversification.
At the other extreme, if P12 = -1.0, then equation (1) reduces to
or (8)
For some combi nation of assets 1 and 2 in expression (8) "p = 0, and
portfol io risk is completely eliminated. Only the upper portion of the
curve in the figure comprises the "efficient" border, however, since along
the lower portion a higher portfolio return is possible for the same risk.
The efficient portfolio frontier is also illustrated in the figure for
other values of P12•
If assets 1 and 2 in this simple example were alternative
international reserve assets, then the correlation between them obviously
would be important in reducing overall risk on a country's total
international reserves. And it is reasonable to assume at least two such
assets if a secondary market in SDR claims is not developed and at least
some currency balances must be held for intervention purposes. It is also
not unrealistic to say that the SDR, as presently constituted, is roughly
equivalent to asset 1 as a low-risk, low-return asset, and that the dollar12
may be represented by asset 2 as a higher-risk, higher-return asset.15 If
correlation between variations in the SDR's value and that of the dollar
were low, then the more curvilinear efficient frontiers in Figure 2 would
be relevant. But the dollar might tend to dominate efficient portfolios in
this case since that higher return portion of the frontier closer to the
dollar is the efficient portion. If the SDR basket continues to give a
major weight to the U.S. currency in its composition, however, then
correlation between their movements is likely to be higher. The SDR would
dominate efficient portfolios if lower portfolio returns were acceptable,
but less would be gained in terms of risk reduction by diversification
between the two.
If the correlation between movements in the SDR and the dollar is
in fact closer to +1, there is some incentive to add a third asset to the
portfolio, or to substitute that asset for either the dollar or the SDR, if
risk reduction on the total reserve portfolio is an important goal. Figure
3 introduces such an asset.
higher-risk, higher-return
alternative reserve currency
Again seeking real world analogies, an even
asset 3 mi ght be representative of an
16 such as the German mark. If correlations
among these three were roughly as depicted in 3(a), then the SDR and the
mark would dominate efficient portfolios in the range of relevant returns;
the dollar would be inferior and excluded from the optimal asset mix. But
the dollar would be included along the overall efficient frontier if either
15. This depends upon the unit by which risk and return are
measured, of course, but the following empirical section lends some support
to these assumptions.
16. Note (15) appl ies here al so.Figure 3















3(b) or 3(c) were descriptive of asset 2 correlations with assets 1 or 3.
In 3(b), some fixed combination of assets 1 and 2 that applies at point B
would combine in varying proportions with asset 3 along the curve from B to
3; from B to 1 assets 1 and 2 only would dominate. In 3(c), a fixed
combi nation of assets 2 and 3 at poi nt C woul d combi ne in varying
proportions with asset 1 along the curve from C to 1; from C to 3 only
assets 2 and 3 would be included in efficient portfolios.
If assets 1, 2, and 3 were in fact representative respectively of
the SDR, the U.S. dollar, and the German mark as potential reserve asset
choices here, it is likely empirically that 3(a) would be most relevant.
Situation 3(b) is not likely because of the dollar's weight in the SDR
basket of currencies, and 3(c) is similarly unlikely because if the SDR and
the dollar are highly correlated bilaterally, then their respective
movements vis-a-vis any third asset are also likely to be similar.
This analysis might be developed further, perhaps including other
potential reserve assets, but it is clear how the optimal mix of assets
depends upon returns and risks associated with each, their correlations
with each other, and the overall return required on the total reserve
portfolio. Since different countries logically have different units in
which these parameters are measured, this aspect also can be crucial. It
is obvious, however, that there is nothing that would necessarily dictate
that the SDR-denominated asset would dominate the optimal asset mix, as is
sometimes assumed in pro-substitution account arguments.
The optimal asset mix is at bottom an empirical question that
must be answered by each individual country. The problem is a difficult
one in practice because the measurement of expected return and risk on14
various assets is ultimately subjective. And the choice of a yardstick
against which to gauge them is also ambiguous. The value of domestic
currency might be chosen as the relevant unit, but perhaps the price of
some exported or imported commodity, or some price index of exports,
imports, or world inflation generally would be judged more appropriate.
The following section is an empirical demonstration of these
aspects of reserve asset portfol io choice. Several cavaets are required
before turning to the results, however.
First, the portfoli0 approach taken here is chosen only to
illustrate a particular aspect of the official reserve asset mix problem.
There are a number of reasons why a given monetary agency might not be able
to, or might not wish to, achieve the asset mix that is indicated as
optimal in the following results, even if measures of relevant parameters
were accepted. Central banks do not manage their reserve portfolios in a
fashion that the private sector might find optimal. Their basic exchange
market intervention function, for example, can dictate the acquisition of a
currency even if it is not a desirable addition to their portfolio. Also,
constraints on portfolio proportions can be imposed by national controls or
binding international agreements. 17 And a number of factors that can
influence their international reserve portfoli 0 are not independent of
their own actions, as would be the case for many private entities.
Second, in addition to the fact that the measurement unit used




Participants in the European joint float, for example,
have restricted their holdings of other members' currencies
amounts.15
the relevant parameters are calculated only from past data. The asset mix
that is found to be optimal here says little in a prescriptive sense about
what the optimal mix should be in the future. It is only a static
portfolio analysis of what the optimal mix would be if all assumptions were
valid and if calculated parameters were truly descriptive. In spite of
these cavaets, however, the empirical results do illustrate intended
points.
An Empirical Illustration of Official Reserve Asset Choice
Using a standard mean-variance portfolio selection technique,
several countries are analysed in this section for a hypothetical optimal
reserve asset mix. The countries examined, chosen on the basis of the
absolute size of their foreign exchange reserves, were West Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, France, Italy, the United Ki ngdom, and Saudi Arabia. These
were the countries that had foreign exchange reserves valued in excess of
10 billion SDRs at the end of 1979. All except Saudi Arabia are
industrialized nations, and the currencies of some of them are targets of
greater reserve asset diversification. As such, these countries especially
may not be able to diversify along the lines indicated as optimal in the
following outcomes, since by intervening to stem the rise in their
currencies brought about by the diversification of others, they are forced
to acquire unwanted U.S. dollars. But it should be underlined that these
countries are analysed here not as potential reserve centers, with the
constraints on their reserve composition that go with this, but simply as
holders of large quantities of reserves. The question to be answered here
is more simply: What would these countries do to minimize risk on their
reserves if no such constraints applied? From a practical point of view,16
Saudi Arabia may be more interesting, since it is typical of a country with
the incentive and the relative ability to actually accomplish the desired
diversification over time.
For the six industrialized countries, the domestic monetary unit
is assumed to be the riskless numeraire against which foreign asset return
and risk are measured. Quarterly annualized percentage rates of change, in
domestic currency per unit of each potential international reserve asset,
were taken from 1975:1, shortly after the SDR's redefinition as a basket of
currencies, through 1979:4. Possible international reserve assets
considered were SDR substitution account claims, assuming that they would
be defined in terms of the standard basket as existing SDR's are, the U.S.
dollar, the German mark, the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen, and gold. In
the cases of Germany, Switzerland, and Japan, their own currencies
naturally were excl uded from the international reserve portfolio. The
currencies include the current and historically most important reserve
unit, the dollar, as well as all of those that have been mentioned
seriously as major candidates for diversification in recent experience, in
spite of the fact that obstacles to these currencies achieving an important
reserve role may exist. To complete the list, gold is also included,
because the metal continues to have monetary status in the eyes of some in
spite of efforts during the past decade to demonetize it. But it is not
included here as any international standard of value, nor as the unit to
which any major currency reserve unit is fixed as the dollar was under the
Bretton Woods system, but instead simply as an alternative official reserve
asset valued at market prices.No such income yiel d was
17
To the percent changes in exchange rates were added interest
yields on each of the currencies and on the SDR-denominated unit.
Three-month interest rates in national markets were taken as an
approximation of yield for the currencies, and the SDR's yield was
approximated in alternative calculations by taking first 80 percent and
then 100 percent of the market formul a.18
included for gold.
For each country j and asset i, then, with t = 1975:1 to 1979:4,
returns were computed as
[
I. \4 j





i Pj is the domestic currency price of the international reserve asset
r~ is the approximated interest on that asset. Means and standard
deviations of the resulting series were then taken as representative of
18. Since credit balances in existing SDR's at this writing pay
72 percent of the weighted average of market rates computed as in Table I,
while debit balances are charged 80 percent of the weighted average rate,
by assuming an 80 percent rate to be paid on substitution account credit
claims the outcomes here may be biased somewhat toward favoring the SDR.
But one goal of substitution account proponents has been to raise the yield
on the SDR in order to make it more attractive to potential holders, even
to the point of paying 100 percent of the market formula. Alternative
outcomes are accessed for this reason which do assume even the 100 percent
payments. As discussed earlier, the actual payment of such higher yields
depends crucially on successful resolution of the account's solvency
problem.18
return and risk associated with each asset,19 and covariations Pij Of OJ
measure interrelationships among assets.
While the remaining country analysed here, Saudi Arabia, may be
more relevant for its comparative ability to diversify efficiently in a
portfolio context over the long run, it is less clear what standard to
choose in measuring portfolio risk and return. For a country wi th
developed capital markets in its currency, and whose central monetary
authorities have a significant domestic component to their own portfolio,
the choice of the domestic currency as a measuring unit is reasonable. But
since many less-developed countries that have a large amount of
diversifiable international reserves, for which Saudi Arabia stands here as
an illustration, do not have such domestic markets nor a currency that is
traded on any significant basis internationally, some other numerai re is
desirable. In this example, the export price of crude petroleum was
chosen. In no sense does this mean by analogy that oil is equivalent to
the Saudi Arabi an currency, but it is reasonabl e to believe that the
country would wish to minimize risk and/or maximize return on investments
it has acquired as a result of selling oil to the world in terms of that
commodity. If the country's return on its reserves in any given period is
less than the value of the commodity oil, then it would have been more
19. Use of standard deviation or variance to gauge foreign
exchange risk accurately is dangerous, since return distributions tend like
those of some other assets to be highly 1eptokurtic, but it may serve in
this illustrative example. Conclusions similar to those here would likely
emerge using other measures of risk as long as variability rankings remain
the same. Westerfield [1977] finds standard deviation to be a misleading
measure of exchange rate variability, but does find rankings among
currencies usi ng standard devi ations to be the same as those usi ng two
other measures of variability under flexible rates of the 1970's.19
rational economic behavior to leave the oil in the ground. Other choices
suggest that themselves, such as some index of the country's imports, or
perhaps some measure of world inflation, might give similar results to
those reported here, but they were not investigated in computations to
follow. All such calculations in this section, it may be recalled, can
only serve as an example of how diversification might work once these and
other assumptions are sett1ed in the mi nds of those making the portfo1i 0
decision. Except for the choice of the numeraire unit, all procedures were
the same for Saudi Arabia as for the other countries.
Means and standard deviations for each asset, across countries
analysed, are given in Table 2, as well as correlation matrices for returns
over the chosen time frame. The mean return column in the table highlights
how choice of the risk-return measuring uni t can be important. Average
returns in all assets for countries with weaker domestic currencies over
the period, for example Italy or the United Kingdom, are higher than those
with a numeraire that itself was rising generally against included
internationa1 assets, for examp1 e West Germany, Swi tzer1and and Saudi
Arabia. When the SDR yield is calculated at 80 percent of the market
formula it is usually the lowest return asset, but its return is always
fairly close to that for the U.S. dollar. When SDR yield is calculated at
100 percent of the formula, its return is slightly higher than the dollar
in every case. (While mean returns for the SDR asset are changed somewhat
by alternative assumptions along these lines, its standard deviations and
correlations with other assets are not changed very much at all.) Low
return assets are sometimes the less risky ones as measured by standard
deviations, but ranking assets by return and risk for each country alwaysTAble Z
Means. StandArd DlvllUons. And ~rrel.tfon Matrlcu
of Percentage Returns for Fhe Potential Resene Assets

















































































































































































































































• Paranete1"S caleulated using an SDR yield equal to eo percent of the llIIrtet fOnll.lla. Figures in parentheses are those using 100 percent of the market
fonrula.20
presents at 1east somewhat di fferent orderings. Go1d val ued at market
prices is unsurprisingly always the highest return asset even without any
income yiel d, but it is also the most risky. Gol d does demonstrate one
other desirable portfoli 0 characteristic in that its correlations wi th
other assets are lower, and correlations between the SDR-denominated asset
and the u.s. dollar are almost always higher than any other cross-correla-
tion in the presented matrices. In the case of Saudi Arabia the cross-
correlation between the German mark and the SDR asset is very slightly
higher than that between the dollar and the SDR, and the mark-SDR correla~
tion is always second highest in other cases. But this is al so not sur-
prising since the weight of the German mark in the SDR basket is second to
the U.S. dollar.
When risk is measured in terms of domestic currency, the SDR
asset is always the most stable. As mentioned previous1y it is this
quality that those in favor of SDR consolidation frequently emphasize in
recommendi ng claims denomi nated in the asset as the primary store of
international liquidity. In the case of Saudi Arabia the variation of the
dollar is marginally less than that of the SDR in terms of the oil
price,20 but both assets are noticeably more stable than any other
potential assets in the portfolio. It becomes obvious from inspection of
these parameters, however, that focusing solely on the SDR's stability
20. Thi s may derive uni ntentionally from the fact that oil is
priced in u.S. dollars, so that the oil price in terms of any other unit
that fluctuates vis-a-vis the dollar will give a series demonstrating at
least slightly more variation. But this may be realistic to the extent
that oil is a relevant unit of measurement here. The fact that Saudi
Arabi a and other OPEC nations continue to price and receive payment for
their oil in u.S. dollars, in spite of periodic mention that they might
switch to the SDR or some other currency basket, lends some support.21
characteristic without al so consideri ng its return and correlation with
other possible reserve assets, is insufficient to determine its
desirability.
Using parameters in Table 2, a standard portfolio selection
approach such as that developed in the previous section can determine a
dominant asset mix for various levels of total portfolio return and risk.
The algorithm utilized here 21 minimizes the objective function







where in matrix notation x is the vector of optimal asset proportions, ~ is
the vector of asset returns, and <P is the variance-covariance matrix of
returns. Constraints (ll) and (12) can be specified, by choice of some
appropriate matrices'!' and Q and vectors f 1 and f 2, to confine various
assets to less than or greater than some given proportion. Although these
constraints were not imposed for the foll owi ng empi rical outcomes, they
could easily be used to characterize various institutional constraints on
reserve asset composition. In examples reported here e was chosen to be
21. This algorithm is an adaptation of program QPF4 available
from the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.22
simply a unit vector and :3 was set equal to one, imposing the fully
invested portfolio constraint, but this general equality constraint also
might be used for certain institutional requirements on the portfolio.
Since constraint (14) requires optimal portfolio proportions to be
positive, the following outcomes do not consider the extent to which
borrowed reserves, or negative portfolio proportions, might be used to
reduce overall risk. This is equivalent to focusing only upon the asset
side of a central bank balance sheet, but this constraint might be relaxed
for some applications. By iteratively choosing various values of A,
equivalent to the slope of the efficient portfoliO frontier at some maximum
return and minimum risk, the locus of efficient points in ~-cr space can be
traced and optimal asset proportions associated with these points can be
determined.
Figures 4 through 10 depict the efficient portfolio frontier for
the seven countries analysed here, using parameters calculated assuming an
SDR yield of 80 percent of the market formula. Various points on the locus
are identified as well as points representing return and risk for each
reserve asset individually. Presented in the inset to the figures are the
dami nant asset proportions associated wi th efficient poi nts identified.
In each figure the point a represents the minimum portfolio risk point over
the entire range of returns, and points b, c, and d represent risks at
higher return levels. The figures also inclUde, where applicable, a point
R on the portfolio border, with portfolio return constrained to be equal to
the average interest rate on three-month domestic deposits in the relevant
country over the chosen time period. This is roughly equivalent to
choosing a minimum risk international reserve asset mix that would yieldFi gure 4
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the same return as that which might accrue to the domestic component of the
central bank's portfolio, if that component were invested in securities
yielding a return similar to the chosen average interest rate.22 In some
cases, this computed return R falls below efficient portion of the computed
portfolio border, so that a higher return than R could be obtained at lower
risk. (See Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom.) In one case, Saudi
Arabia, the entire computed efficient frontier fall s below several proxies
for R. (Again, since the domestic component of the monetary authorities'
portfolio is irrelevant in this case, some other benchmark must be chosen.
If R were proxied by the period's average return on three-month eurodollar
deposits, for example, this would be 7.86 > 7.76 percent, the portfolio's
return if it were totally invested in the highest return asset here, gold.)
Another efficient portfolio frontier (not depicted) was computed
using the SDR asset yield estimated at 100 percent of the market formula.
Often the shape of the frontier and the optimal asset mix did not vary
appreciably at some portfolio return levels from those reported using the
SDR yield calculated at 80 percent of the market formula. But especially
at lower portfolio return levels the SDR asset more frequently eclipsed the
dollar in the optimal asset mix, since, as indicated in Table 2, the SDR
under this assumption is both a higher return and a lower risk asset than
the dollar. For comparison, one other risk-return point R' is reported in
the insets to the figures where applicable, that corresponding to the
return R on this alternative portfolio frontier.
22. As in computing the returns on reserve assets themselves,
the nearest equivalent of a three-month interbank loan rate was used for
this calculation. To the extent that either international reserve assets
in foreign markets or domestic assets are invested in instruments for which
these interest rates are not representative, outcomes may not be accurate,
but this assumption may suffice for approximations in these examples.24
It is evident from inspection of the dominant asset proportions
that the mix can vary substantially depending upon the specified level of
portfolio return. At lower portfolio return levels the SDR frequently has
a relatively large share of the optimal asset mix. (See West Germany,
Japan, France, Italy, and the United Ki ngdom.) Even when the SDR income
yield is calculated at 80 percent of the market formula, then, its low risk
characteristics can make it a desirable asset if return demanded on the
overall reserve asset portfolio is low. Its share diminishes as higher
levels of portfolio return are specified, however, and it frequently loses
ground very quickly to other assets in the mix as specified portfolio
return is increased. Using the returns R as some gauge of desired return
the SDR would constitute about half of the German portfolio and slightly
less of the French portfolio. Since R falls below the efficient part of
the portfolio frontier for Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and since
the SDR occupies a large share of those portfol ios at the minimum risk
point a. especially for the latter two, it is reasonable to assume a large
SDR share for these portfolios also. But the SDR does not appear in the
Swiss or Saudi Arabian portfolios as computed here at all.
Interestingly the dollar does not make a very strong showing in
most portfolios. The U.S. currency is dominant at low return levels in
Saudi Arabian portfolios, owing largely to the fact that measurement of
risk and return for this country in terms of the exported commodi ty oil
makes the dollar a lower risk asset than the SDR. In German. Japanese, and
French portfolios at some levels of return, and to a lesser extent in some
Italian and British portfolios, the dollar does appear in the optimal mix
of assets. But its proportion in all of these is much less than its actual
current share in official reserves.•
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Frequently, especially in higher return portfolios, the German
mark, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen occupy important positions. And as
portfolio returns become very high, gold naturally dominates, since in the
limit the highest possible return portfol io for all countries is composed
entirely of gold. Gold's high risk, however, generally prevents the metal
from havi ng a very 1arge share, except in a case such as Saudi Arabia in
which alternative asset choices offer such a relatively low return.
By calculating the efficient portfolio border using the SDR with
100 percent of market formula yield, then measuring minimum risk at the
average domestic interest rate by point R', some information is gleaned.
Among the cases in which the domestic interest rate falls within the range
of the computed efficient border--Germany, Swi tzerland, and France--only
Germany shows a reduction in portfolio risk at the chosen return.
Portfolio proportions do not vary much for Germany between Rand R' • The
SDR share rises to 60 percent from 51 percent. For Switzerland there is no
difference between Rand R' since the SDR does not appear in the dominant
asset mix. And for France, although the minimum risk point changes hardly
at all, the SDR's share rises to 68 percent from 44 percent, driVing out
the smaller currency shares for the dollar, the Swiss franc, and the yen
that are included in the 80 percent SDR yield portfolio.
Conclusions
The previously mentioned 1imitations on interpretation of these
results bear reiteration. The choice of portfolio numeraire units, the
estimation of portfolio parameters from historical data, the choice of
assets that are considered candidates for optimal portfolios, and the
portfolio return at which an optimal asset mix is evaluated all involve26
rather heroic assumptions if one interprets the outcomes to be normative in
any sense. In addition, correspondence of the portfolio model to the real
world is damaged by assuming the measured parameters to encompass all those
factors that enter into the formation of central monetary authority
attitudes toward chosen assets. For example, there is no consideration of
the extent to whi ch depth of markets in whi ch the assets are hel d can
influence such attitudes,23 and no incorporation of the fact that central
banks might not be able to acquire assets in indicated proportions even if
they did wish to do so. Finally, existing or potential future
institutional constraints on reserve asset composition are ignored.
Even so, the results illustrate how it is at least possible for
the indicated combinations of reserve assets to be optimal if one
concentrates solely on the portfolio aspects isolated here. The fact that
the SDR-denominated asset does dominate several portfolios from this
standpoint suggests that the substitution account might be subject to
substantial voluntary use if other problems surrounding its institution can
be overcome. But the presence of significant amounts of the other assets
in some portfolios also suggests that, when viewed from a global
perspective, the SDR-denomi nated substitution account claims might not
occupy the central and most dominant position among reserve assets. The
underlying goal of making the SDR the world's primary international reserve
asset might, therefore, continue to be frustrated.
23. It might not be difficult to incorporate some measure of
relative liquidity of alternative reserve assets, based perhaps on some
measure of the depth of various capital markets, into the portfolio
framework utilized here, but such a measure would likely be rather
subjective. If this were done, it would quite probably enhance the U.S.
dollar's share in portfolios, but it would almost certainly not help the
SDR since it is the least liquid among assets considered here.•
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Particularly instructive may be the case of Saudi Arabia, since
it represents here the kind of country that would be most able to diversify
more over time. This is the only country investigated here for which a
noticeable portion of its computed efficient portfol io border fall s at
netagive rates of return, and even along the higher-return, higher-risk
portion of it the achievable returns are not very great. This would be the
case, moreover, regardless of the measurement unit chosen as long as that
unit moved approximately in line with world inflation. The SDR never
appears in optimal portfolios here, and even if, by some alternative choice
of the numeraire unit, it did appear at lower returns, it would like the
dollar in the example drop out at higher levels in favor of the higher
return currencies and gold. If this single illustration characterizes the
possibly large number of outer countries that are likely to be most active
in diversifying, then alternative reserve currencies might be even more
dominant on a global scale than a more superficial inspection of the
results here would indicate.
International monetary reformers are therefore left to
contemplate, barring alternative means of SDR valuation and perhaps even
then, the possibility of a multiple reserve asset system even if
substitution account plans go more smoothly than they are likely to go. If
the multiple reserve system is inevitable the question of whether it is
desirable may be moot, but there will still likely be some disagreement on
just how disruptive such a system will be. To an extent some surface
opposition to it may come from a confusion of stocks and flows. Official
portfolio shifts in the transition to some desired currency mix may be
disruptive, but once that mix is achieved approximately central banks may28
not be nearly as active in reacting to possibly transient changes in
exchange rate expectations as private entities are.24 During that
transition, the use of off-market diversification faci1 ities has been
suggested to ease the strain,25 and there has been some recent indication
that such channels may actually be used.26
Some followers of recent developments no doubt conclude that the
only hopes for a workable and achievable system still lie with the U.S.
dollar, and therefore the U.S. monetary policies that are so important in
underpinning this currency's international role. Since October 1979, and
especially since the beginning of the year 1980, strength in the dollar has
reportedly halted substantially the diversification out of the currency.
But strictly in the portfolio context that has been a vehicle for this
paper, even if the expected return on any single asset is quite attractive
24. Those less upset by the prospect of a multiple currency
system also may argue that any change is de facto one of degree rather than
kind. Other reserve currencies have existed along with the U.S. dollar to
a minor extent since the beginning of managed floating, and at no point in
modern experience has any single asset dominated entirely. The British
pound coexisted with the U.S. dollar for years under the Bretton Woods
system, and even under the pre-World War I classical gol d standard the
German mark and the French franc, along with the pound sterling, comprised
significant portions of the world's official foreign exchange balances. A
multiple currency system under the gold standard or Bretton Woods is
markedly different than one under managed floating, of course, since no
form of exchange rate guarantee exists under the current system. But it is
interesting to note (see Lindert [1969]) that liquid claims on the major
reserve centers in the pre-1914 world did exceed their own total reserves,
the same kind of situation that later in this century led to the
discontinuation of the U.S. dollar's gold convertibility.
25. See Morgan Guaranty Bank [1979b].
26. See The Banker [1980].•
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the incentives for di versification sti11 exist. One is 1eft to conc1 ude
tentatively that reserve asset diversification is likely to continue to at
1east some degree over the longer run even if (1) U.S. pol icies are
re1 ative1y di scip1 ined, and (2) the substitution account is instituted.
While some countries may avail themselves of the substitution account,
others may not. One may argue for the institution of such an account for
the benefit of the former, but the latter will likely insure a multiple
reserve system on a global basis in any case. This paper is not intended
to argue for the relative viability of a multiple reserve system, however.
It only suggests that it may be the most likely course•30
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